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	<title>Comments on: Rethinking risk management with Algorithmics</title>
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	<link>http://www.wikinomics.com/blog/index.php/2007/11/27/rethinking-risk-management/</link>
	<description>Exploring How Mass Collaboration Changes Everything</description>
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		<title>By: management coaching</title>
		<link>http://www.wikinomics.com/blog/index.php/2007/11/27/rethinking-risk-management/comment-page-1/#comment-108479</link>
		<dc:creator>management coaching</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 07 Apr 2008 13:36:38 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>&lt;strong&gt;management coaching&lt;/strong&gt;

Networking as a management coach is a very competitive field. Others told me that using interlinking websites might make a difference in getting found and recognized as an authority. Did you notice some positive effects with using this site?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>management coaching</strong></p>
<p>Networking as a management coach is a very competitive field. Others told me that using interlinking websites might make a difference in getting found and recognized as an authority. Did you notice some positive effects with using this site?</p>
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		<title>By: Bob Tapscott</title>
		<link>http://www.wikinomics.com/blog/index.php/2007/11/27/rethinking-risk-management/comment-page-1/#comment-65177</link>
		<dc:creator>Bob Tapscott</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 02 Dec 2007 23:07:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.wikinomics.com/blog/index.php/2007/11/27/rethinking-risk-management/#comment-65177</guid>
		<description>IFSL research has reported that the nominal value of OTC derivatives has leaped from $50 trillion in 1996 to over $415 trillion today.  That&#039;s roughly twelve times the GDPs of the US, the European Union, Canada, Japan, and China combined.

In other words, decades ago the derivatives market moved far beyond being a place to simply hedge risk, but has become to some degree, the world&#039;s largest casino.   

The major players in these markets have mathematical models, and computer systems that, in theory, will ensure that losses are contained. 

For example, one Wall Street player&#039;s computerized systems work on the mathematical assumption that exceptional downside risks could be managed 99% of the time.  The question of course is what happens the other 1%? 

More specifically Wall Street&#039;s systems (in my experience) are programmed on the assumption that markets are fluid, and that as the value of an asset falls, that one can sell it at a pre-determined price, thus capping ones potential losses. The fear of course is that on &quot;Black Monday&quot; and other major market retreats, experience has shown that in a free fall attempts to sell at a given price is of little use when everyone is selling. 

Orange County&#039;s derivatives-based bankruptcy in 1994, the short-lived experience of Long-Term Capital, are examples of the huge inherent risks that parties can hold, without fully understanding the risk. 

Clearly the entrance of private unregulated Hedge Funds, their massive capital bases, and their willingness to highly leverage their capital may as did Long-Term capital threaten the solvency of the entire system.  
 
In the case of Orange County it is clear that those from the county were unaware of the risks, until long after it was too late to mitigate them. 

Can further transparency in the marketplace better control the risks? Can crowd sourcing better predict future market behaviors?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>IFSL research has reported that the nominal value of OTC derivatives has leaped from $50 trillion in 1996 to over $415 trillion today.  That&#8217;s roughly twelve times the GDPs of the US, the European Union, Canada, Japan, and China combined.</p>
<p>In other words, decades ago the derivatives market moved far beyond being a place to simply hedge risk, but has become to some degree, the world&#8217;s largest casino.   </p>
<p>The major players in these markets have mathematical models, and computer systems that, in theory, will ensure that losses are contained. </p>
<p>For example, one Wall Street player&#8217;s computerized systems work on the mathematical assumption that exceptional downside risks could be managed 99% of the time.  The question of course is what happens the other 1%? </p>
<p>More specifically Wall Street&#8217;s systems (in my experience) are programmed on the assumption that markets are fluid, and that as the value of an asset falls, that one can sell it at a pre-determined price, thus capping ones potential losses. The fear of course is that on &#8220;Black Monday&#8221; and other major market retreats, experience has shown that in a free fall attempts to sell at a given price is of little use when everyone is selling. </p>
<p>Orange County&#8217;s derivatives-based bankruptcy in 1994, the short-lived experience of Long-Term Capital, are examples of the huge inherent risks that parties can hold, without fully understanding the risk. </p>
<p>Clearly the entrance of private unregulated Hedge Funds, their massive capital bases, and their willingness to highly leverage their capital may as did Long-Term capital threaten the solvency of the entire system.  </p>
<p>In the case of Orange County it is clear that those from the county were unaware of the risks, until long after it was too late to mitigate them. </p>
<p>Can further transparency in the marketplace better control the risks? Can crowd sourcing better predict future market behaviors?</p>
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		<title>By: James Taylor</title>
		<link>http://www.wikinomics.com/blog/index.php/2007/11/27/rethinking-risk-management/comment-page-1/#comment-63413</link>
		<dc:creator>James Taylor</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 29 Nov 2007 20:57:05 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.wikinomics.com/blog/index.php/2007/11/27/rethinking-risk-management/#comment-63413</guid>
		<description>Interestingly this is pretty much what the credit card issuers do to handle fraud today. They share data (anonymized) so that models can be developed to predict fraud across issuers. By aggregating their data they can have better models built. All the issuers gain from reduced fraud. Two challenges would seem to apply to apply a wikinomics approach:
- the credit card consortium uses a trusted intermediary to store and process the shared data. This may be necessary for this kind of data
- the issuers decided that reducing fraud was not a source of competitive advantage and so were willing to collaborate for shared benefit. How do you get organizations to see a given problem in this light?
Good luck though
JT</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Interestingly this is pretty much what the credit card issuers do to handle fraud today. They share data (anonymized) so that models can be developed to predict fraud across issuers. By aggregating their data they can have better models built. All the issuers gain from reduced fraud. Two challenges would seem to apply to apply a wikinomics approach:<br />
- the credit card consortium uses a trusted intermediary to store and process the shared data. This may be necessary for this kind of data<br />
- the issuers decided that reducing fraud was not a source of competitive advantage and so were willing to collaborate for shared benefit. How do you get organizations to see a given problem in this light?<br />
Good luck though<br />
JT</p>
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		<title>By: Don Tapscott</title>
		<link>http://www.wikinomics.com/blog/index.php/2007/11/27/rethinking-risk-management/comment-page-1/#comment-61449</link>
		<dc:creator>Don Tapscott</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 27 Nov 2007 18:35:11 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.wikinomics.com/blog/index.php/2007/11/27/rethinking-risk-management/#comment-61449</guid>
		<description>Edmundo.  This sounds like a fruitful collaboration!</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Edmundo.  This sounds like a fruitful collaboration!</p>
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		<title>By: Edmundo</title>
		<link>http://www.wikinomics.com/blog/index.php/2007/11/27/rethinking-risk-management/comment-page-1/#comment-61311</link>
		<dc:creator>Edmundo</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 27 Nov 2007 16:16:54 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.wikinomics.com/blog/index.php/2007/11/27/rethinking-risk-management/#comment-61311</guid>
		<description>The Risk Management series that I proposed to Deepak could address this research as one of its topics. If not, I would like to throw my name in the hat.  

There is a significant amount of transparency required for financial services institutions by Sarbanes Oxley (US )and Basel II (globally).  A well implemented Basel II program was designed to prevent the types of tsunami that recently occurred with the mortage meltdown.  However, Basel II is being inconsistently (content and timing) implemented across jurisdictions and risk models (a major input for Basel II) are generally considered proprietary as global banks spend (in sames cases misspent) millions in developing and maintaining them. It looks like the risk models require major rework, as the only investment bank to avoid the meltdown, Goldman Sachs, did not rely on models, but on a savvy executive to minimize the impact.

I spent my last two years at Citi as the Global Technology lead for the Basel II program.  I have access to a number of Basel II SMEs, including two of my current associates.  One of my major deliverables for Citi was a transparency and traceability framework, as these two powerful concepts are implied by the Basel II accord.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Risk Management series that I proposed to Deepak could address this research as one of its topics. If not, I would like to throw my name in the hat.  </p>
<p>There is a significant amount of transparency required for financial services institutions by Sarbanes Oxley (US )and Basel II (globally).  A well implemented Basel II program was designed to prevent the types of tsunami that recently occurred with the mortage meltdown.  However, Basel II is being inconsistently (content and timing) implemented across jurisdictions and risk models (a major input for Basel II) are generally considered proprietary as global banks spend (in sames cases misspent) millions in developing and maintaining them. It looks like the risk models require major rework, as the only investment bank to avoid the meltdown, Goldman Sachs, did not rely on models, but on a savvy executive to minimize the impact.</p>
<p>I spent my last two years at Citi as the Global Technology lead for the Basel II program.  I have access to a number of Basel II SMEs, including two of my current associates.  One of my major deliverables for Citi was a transparency and traceability framework, as these two powerful concepts are implied by the Basel II accord.</p>
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